BROWN ET AL. v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA ET AL.
No. 1
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
347
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Reargued December 8, 1953.
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS. *
* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued
December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued
December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart
et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued
December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.
CASE SUMMARY
|
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff African-American
minors challenged the judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas that, although it held that segregation in public
education had a detrimental effect upon African-American children, denied
relief on the ground that the schools were substantially equal with respect
to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of
teachers. |
|
OVERVIEW: By consolidated opinion, the
Court reviewed four state cases in which African-American minors sought
admission to the public schools of their community on a non-segregated basis.
In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by
Caucasian children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according
to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the minors of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each case, except
the Delaware case, the district court denied relief to the minors on the
"separate but equal" doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. The minors
contended that the public schools were not equal and could not be made equal,
thereby denying them equal protection of the law. The common legal question
among the cases was whether Plessy should be held
inapplicable to public education and whether segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other tangible factors were equal, deprived the children of
the minority group of equal educational opportunities. The Court held in the
affirmative as to both. |
|
OUTCOME: The Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson and the "separate but equal"
doctrine, finding that it had no place in public education. Segregation was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Separate educational facilities were inherently unequal. |
CORE TERMS: negro, segregation, public education, public schools,
decree, Fourteenth Amendment, educational, equal protection, equalization,
deprive, high school, segregated, inferior, reargument,
tangible, transportation, qualifications, three-judge, curricula, residing,
enjoin, inferiority, colored, substantially equal, state constitution, direct
appeal, inequality, elementary, convened, plant
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
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SYLLABUS: Segregation of white and Negro children in the public
schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws
permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment -- even though
the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and
Negro schools may be equal. Pp. 486-496.
(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended
effect on public education. Pp. 489-490.
(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined, not on the basis
of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the
light of the full development of public education and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation. Pp. 492-493.
(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in
its public schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms. P. 493.
(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though
the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal.
Pp. 493-494.
(e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, has no place
in the field of public education. P. 495.
(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified
questions relating to the forms of the decrees. Pp. 495-496.
COUNSEL: Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. 1
on the original argument and on the reargument. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for appellants in No. 2
on the original argument and Spottswood W. Robinson,
III, for appellants in No. 4 on the original argument, and both argued the
causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument.
Louis L. Redding and Jack Greenberg argued the cause for respondents in No. 10
on the original argument and Jack Greenberg and Thurgood
Marshall on the reargument.
On the briefs were Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall,
Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L. Redding, Jack
Greenberg, George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley,
James M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D.
Reeves, Harold R. Boulware and Oliver W. Hill for
appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10; George M. Johnson for
appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4; and Loren Miller for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4.
Arthur D. Shores and A. T. Walden were on the Statement as to Jurisdiction and
a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 2.
Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General.
John W. Davis argued the cause for appellees in No. 2
on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2
and 4 on the reargument. With him on the briefs in
No. 2 were T. C. Callison, Attorney General of South
Carolina, Robert McC. Figg,
Jr., S. E. Rogers, William R. Meagher and Taggart Whipple.
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore
argued the cause for appellees in No. 4 on the
original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4
on the reargument. On the briefs in No. 4 were J.
Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, and Henry T. Wickham,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and T. Justin
Moore, Archibald G. Robertson, John W. Riely and T.
Justin Moore, Jr. for the Prince Edward County School Authorities, appellees.
H. Albert Young, Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners
in No. 10 on the original argument and on the reargument.
With him on the briefs was Louis J. Finger, Special Deputy Attorney General.
By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause
for the United States on the reargument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10. With him on the brief were Attorney
General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. Lamont and M. Magdelena
Schoch. James P. McGranery,
then Attorney General, and Philip Elman filed a brief
for the United States on the original argument, as amicus
curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance
in No. 10.
Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1
were filed by Shad Polier, Will Maslow
and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; by Edwin J. Lukas,
Arnold Forster, Arthur Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen,
Leonard Haas, Saburo Kido
and Theodore Leskes for the American Civil Liberties
Union et al.; and by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the American Federation of Teachers. Briefs
of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 and
respondents in No. 10 were filed by Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris for
the Congress of Industrial Organizations and by Phineas
Indritz for the American Veterans Committee, Inc.
JUDGES: Warren, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson,
Burton, Clark, Minton
OPINIONBY: WARREN
OPINION: [*486] [**687] [***876] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of
the Court.
[1]
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions,
but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this
consolidated opinion. n1
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n1 In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro
children of elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action
in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin
enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of
more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and
white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority,
the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary
schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court,
convened under 28
U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a
detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that
the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings,
transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98
F.Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal
under 28
U. S. C. § 1253.
In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children
of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They
brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and
whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, § 7; S. C. Code § 5377 (1942).
The three-judge District Court, convened under 28
U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that
the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants
to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the
validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the
white schools during the equalization program. 98
F.Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District
Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's
views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the
equalization program. 342
U.S. 350. On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had
been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to
rectify this inequality as well. 103
F.Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct
appeal under 28
U. S. C. § 1253.
In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro
children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory
code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va.
Const., § 140; Va. Code § 22-221 (1950). The three-judge District Court, convened
under 28
U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found the
Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and
ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and
transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch
to remove" the inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina
case, the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied
the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103
F.Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal
under 28
U. S. C. § 1253.
In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro
children of both elementary and high school age residing in New Castle County.
They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin
enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which
require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Del. Const.,
Art. X, § 2; Del. Rev. Code § 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgment for the
plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously attended
only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were inferior with
respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities,
physical plant, and time and distance involved in travel. 87
A. 2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an
inferior education for Negro children (see note 10, infra), but did not rest his decision
on that ground. Id., at 865. The Chancellor's decree
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that
the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after
equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91
A. 2d 137, 152. The defendants, contending only that the Delaware courts
had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the
white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344
U.S. 891. The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a
cross-petition.
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[*487] [**688] [***877] In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through
their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission
to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated
basis. In each instance, [*488] they had been denied admission to schools attended
by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to
race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases
other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied
relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal"
doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that
doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided
substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In
the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but
ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their
superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal"
and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the
equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question
presented, the Court took jurisdiction. n2 Argument was heard in the 1952 Term,
and reargument was heard this Term on certain
questions propounded by the Court. n3
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n2 344
U.S. 1, 141, 891.
n3 345
U.S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms
as amicus curiae.
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[*489]
[2]
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered
exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the
states, then existing practices [***878] in racial segregation, and the views of proponents
and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation
convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it [**689] is not enough to resolve the problem with
which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of
the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal
distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the
letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited
effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot
be determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history,
with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that
time. n4 In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported
[*490] by general taxation, had
not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of
private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically
all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was
forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved
outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and
professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the
Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on
Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the
North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing
today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded
schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year
in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a
consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public
education.
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n4 For a general study of the development of public education prior to the
Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of
Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley,
Public Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices
current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described
in Butts and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley,
supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922),
cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1871). Although the demand for free public schools followed substantially the
same pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did
not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in
the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South (e. g.,
the rural character of the South and the different regional attitudes toward
state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra,
at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War
virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id., at 427-428. The low status of
Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately
after the War, is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American
Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not
generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.
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In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided
shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all
state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. n5 The doctrine of [*491] "separate but [**690] equal" did not make its appearance
[***879] in this Court until 1896 in
the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not
education but transportation. n6 American courts have since labored with the
doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases
involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public
education. n7 In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of
the doctrine itself was not challenged. n8 In more recent cases, all on the
graduate school [*492] level, inequality was found
in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro
students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337;
Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637.
In none of these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant
relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly
reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to
public education.
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n5 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-308
(1880):
"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that
the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that
all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the
States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment
was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by
law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity,
or right, most valuable to the colored race, -- the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, -- exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a
subject race."
See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 344-345 (1880).
n6 The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1850), upholding school
segregation against attack as being violative of a
state constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public
schools was eliminated in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the
North segregation in public education has persisted in some communities until
recent years. It is apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide
problem, not merely one of sectional concern.
n7 See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
n8 In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the
defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for white
children until the board resumed operation of a high school for Negro children.
Similarly, in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of
Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities had misapplied the
doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend a
Negro school.
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In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that
the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of
teachers, and other "tangible" factors. n9 Our decision, therefore, cannot
turn on merely a [***880]
comparison of these tangible factors [**691] in the Negro and white schools involved in each of
the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public
education.
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n9 In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all
such factors. 98
F.Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the
court below found that the defendants were proceeding "promptly and in good
faith to comply with the court's decree." 103
F.Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court
below noted that the equalization program was already "afoot and
progressing" (103
F.Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been
advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument,
that the program has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below
similarly noted that the state's equalization program was well under way. 91
A. 2d 137, 149.
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[3]
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout [*493] the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined
if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.
[4]
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
[5]
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a
segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational
opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the
Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated
like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". .
. his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students, and, in general, to learn his profession." [*494] Such considerations apply with added force
to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on
their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case
by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro
plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive [***881] them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly]
integrated school system." n10
[**692] Whatever may have been the
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modern authority. n11 Any language [*495] in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected.
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n10 A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: "I conclude from the
testimony that in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education
itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational
opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white
children otherwise similarly situated." 87
A. 2d 862, 865.
n11 K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development (Midcentury White House Conference on
Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science
Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation
Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229
(1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination
and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949), 44-48;
Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).
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[6]
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. n12
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n12 See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this
decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation
of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was
necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of
segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is
a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the
full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be
restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further
argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. n13 The Attorney General [*496] of the United [***882] States is again invited to
participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting
segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by
September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. n14
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n13 "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates
the Fourteenth Amendment
"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within
the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit
an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated
systems to a system not based on color distinctions?
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further
that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in
question 4 (b),
"(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these
cases;
"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
"(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear
evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
"(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance
with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general
directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should
the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more
detailed decrees?"
n14 See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).
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It is so ordered.
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